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 Racial profiling is a pervasive issue for immigrants in the United States, and it is 
becoming increasingly problematic for Latinos2 living and working in the predominantly rural 
communities of Greater Minnesota.  Reports from throughout the state indicate that Latinos are 
disproportionately targeted by the police on a regular basis. 
 In the waning days of the 2013 session of the Minnesota Legislature, advocates filled the 
Capitol rotunda to demand action on a myriad of unresolved social and economic issues.  Often 
ignored by passing legislators, lobbyists and staff, a handful of Latino immigrants sat quietly on 
folding chairs in front of the entrance to the chamber of the House of Representatives.  They held 
hand-made signs to explain that they were on a hunger strike to prompt action on a bill that 
would allow Minnesota residents to obtain a driving-only license regardless of immigration 
status.3  In spite of the days-long hunger strike, the House failed to act on the bill before the end 
of session.4   
 This issue remains a priority for immigrants’ rights advocates and we will likely see 
similar efforts in future sessions of the Minnesota Legislature. Advocates have raised numerous 
arguments in support of expanding the driver’s license privilege. Their arguments focus 
                                                
2 For purposes of this article, we will use terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably.  
3 See John Croman, Immigrants stage hunger strike over driver’s licenses, USA TODAY (May 14, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/14/immigrant-hunger-
strike/2159419/. 
4 Allison Herrera, Hungering for a driver’s license: Effort by undocumented immigrants comes 
close, but not this year, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2013/05/21/hungering-drivers-license-effort-undocumented-
immigrants-comes-close-not-year. 





primarily on the benefits to public safety.5  Often overlooked in this discussion is the effect that 
expanding the privilege could have on decreasing instances of the racial profiling of Latino 
residents.   
 This article begins with a discussion of the work of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), and its Minnesota affiliate, relating to immigrants’ rights. Next, this article provides 
an overview of current federal and state laws dealing with racial profiling. This discussion of 
current laws will focus on law enforcement stops of Latino drivers.  Third, this article analyzes 
the debate over providing driver’s licenses to state residents regardless of immigration status.  
Finally, this article concludes that, given the current state of racial profiling law, allowing a 
driver’s license privilege to all Minnesota residents is sound public policy that has the potential 
to decrease instances of racial profiling. 
II. THE GREATER MINNESOTA RACIAL JUSTICE PROJECT 
 The ACLU concerns itself with the constitutional rights and liberties of all people in the 
United States, not just U.S. citizens.6  The fundamental constitutional protections of due process 
and equal protection embodied in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights apply to 
every "person" and are not limited to citizens.7   
 
 
                                                
5 See, e.g., Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Fact Sheet: Why Denying Driver’s Licenses to 
Undocumented Immigrants Harms Public Safety and Makes Our Communities Less Secure, 
NILC.ORG (Jan. 12, 2008), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=878. 
6 ACLU, Immigrants’ Rights: No Human Being is Illegal, ACLU.ORG, 
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights [hereinafter “No Human Being is Illegal”]. 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); see generally No 
Human Being is Illegal, supra note 6.  





 A. IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS ADVOCACY  
 The national ACLU organization formed due to concerns of civil libertarians regarding 
the treatment of immigrants in the 1920s.8  In late 1919 and early 1920, the government 
summarily detained and deported many immigrants because of their political views.9  In what 
became known as the “Palmer Raids,” Attorney General Mitchell Palmer targeted, arrested, and 
deported so-called “radical” immigrants without regard to constitutional protections or individual 
civil liberties.10  Since then, the ACLU has defended non-citizens trying to exercise their rights 
and has fought anti-immigrant laws throughout the country.11  For example, the ACLU was 
instrumental in the recent racial profiling case against Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County, 
Arizona, for his aggressive persecution of racial minorities in his community.12   
 The ACLU of Minnesota13 was founded in 1952, and its Greater Minnesota Racial Justice 
Project (“GMRJP”) opened an office in Mankato, Minnesota in 2011.14  The goal of the GMRJP 
                                                
8 ACLU, ACLU History, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-history [hereinafter “ACLU History”]. 
9 ACLU, About the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-
rights/about-aclus-immigrants-rights-project [hereinafter “About the Immigrants’ Rights 
Project”].   
10 See ACLU History, supra note 8. 
11 See About the Immigrants’ Rights Project, supra note 9.  For example, the ACLU has litigated 
cases in the United States Supreme Court, including Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), which upheld immigrants’ right to habeas corpus and 
reversed deportation of longtime legal residents.   
12 Melendres v. Arpaio, No. PHX–CV–07–02513–GMS, 2013 WL 2297173 (D. Ariz. May 24, 
2013); see also Press Release, ACLU, Federal Court Rules Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Violated 
U.S. Constitution (May 24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/print/immigrants-rights-racial-
justice/federal-court-rules-arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-violated-us. 
13 The ACLU of Minnesota is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting the 
civil liberties of all Minnesotans under the United States and Minnesota constitutions.  It 
promotes its mission through litigation, public education and lobbying efforts. 
14 See ACLU of Minnesota, Why We Chose Mankato: A Message from the ACLU-MN’s 
Executive Director, Chuck Samuelson, http://www.aclu-





is to address the problems of unequal and biased treatment of communities of color in all levels 
of the criminal justice system in Greater Minnesota.15 
 B. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS IN SOUTHERN MINNESOTA 
 Southern Minnesota is home to many small and isolated communities dealing with a 
rapid influx of immigrants.  United States Census Bureau data, which is often low when counting 
undocumented populations, shows a significant increase in the number of Latinos living in the 
region over the last ten-year period.16  This rise in the number of Latino residents can be 
attributed to economic considerations and jobs marketed toward migrant workers, including 
several food processing plants in Southern Minnesota.17  An Equal Opportunity Commission 
report from 1998 notes that 33% of workers in the meat and poultry products industries in South 
Central Minnesota are Latino.18  As the chart below demonstrates, several counties in Southern 
Minnesota have seen dramatic changes in their demographics between 2000 and 2010, showing 
continued growth of the Latino population.  
                                                                                                                                                       
mn.org/issues/racialjustice/gmrjpsouth/whywechosemankato/ [hereinafter “Why We Chose 
Mankato”]. 
15 Id. 
16 Mankato, Minnesota Population: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics, 
Statistics, Quick Facts, CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/city/MN/Mankato. 
17 See generally James J. Kielkopf, Estimating the Economic Impact of the Latino Workforce in 
South Central Minnesota, CTR. FOR RURAL POL’Y AND DEV. (Sept. 2000), 
http://www.ruralmn.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/latinoworkforce.pdf. 
18 James J. Kielkopf, The Economic Impact of Undocumented Workers in Minnesota, HISPANIC 
ADVOCACY AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT THROUGH RESEARCH (HACER), 9 (Sept. 2000), 
http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/giddings/ECO108/hacer.pdf. 























Blue Earth 988 1.8 1,600 2.5 6.1 62 
Brown 545 2.0 854 3.3 5.6 57 
Faribault 566 3.5 815 5.6 4.4 44 
Freeborn 2,049 6.3 2,750 8.8 3.4 34 
Le Sueur 997 3.9 1,441 5.2 4.4 45 
Martin 421 1.9 750 3.6 7.8 78 
McLeod 1,268 3.6 1,811 4.9 4.2 43 
Mower 1,646 4.2 4,138 10.6 15.1 151 
Nicollet 535 1.8 1,211 3.7 12.7 126 
Nobles 2,325 11.1 4,820 22.5 10.7 107 
Rice 3,117 5.5 5,122 8.0 6.4 64 
Sibley 834 5.4 1,096 7.2 3.1 31 
Steele 1,266 3.7 2,282 6.2 8.0 80 
Waseca 566 2.9 976 5.1 7.2 72 
Watonwan 1,804 15.2 2,343 20.9 3.0 30 
Total pop. 18,927  32,009  6.9 69 
*This chart was compiled by the authors using data from the United States Census Bureau.   
See Mankato, Minnesota Population, supra footnote 15.* 
 
 Since 2011, the GMRJP has conducted community outreach to identify and assist with 
civil liberties issues faced by Latino communities in Southern Minnesota.19  The Project found 
that these communities often face hardships based on the language barrier, cultural differences, 
and a lack of understanding of their rights and the U.S. criminal justice system.20  Based on 
extensive outreach activities and interviews, the GMRJP found that Latino residents routinely 
face issues of racial profiling, fear of law enforcement and disengagement from the 
community.21   
                                                
19 See Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14.   
20 See generally Greater Minnesota Racial Justice Project Newsletter, Vol. 1, Issue 1, (ACLU), 
Winter 2013, http://www.aclu-
mn.org/files/7013/8687/1945/ACLU_south_newletter_Winter_2013.pdf.  
21 See, e.g., Dan Linehan, Gaylord defends officer against claims of profiling, THE FREE PRESS, 
MANKATO, MN (April 6, 2013), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/local/x1319127296/Gaylord-
defends-officer-against-claims-of-profiling.  





 C. DATA ON ARREST RATES AND PENDING LITIGATION  
 Prior to opening the GMRJP office in Mankato, the ACLU of Minnesota filed Data 
Practices Requests in order to obtain data on arrests and juvenile apprehensions by race and 
ethnicity.22  This data, coupled with stories of racial profiling of immigrants related to the ACLU 
of Minnesota by members of the community, raised concerns of over-policing of minorities 
throughout Southern Minnesota, particularly in the Mankato area.23  As outlined in the following 
chart compiled from data reported by the individual counties to the Minnesota Bureau of 
Criminal Apprehension from 2008 to 2010, the percentage of Latinos arrested in these counties 
appears disproportionally high.24 
 
County Hispanic county population (%) Hispanic adult arrests (%) 
Blue Earth 2.5 6.2 
Faribault 5.6 6.9 
Le Sueur 5.2 10.4 
Martin 3.6 9.8 
Nicollet 3.7 14.8 
Nobles 22.5 27.5 
Steele 6.2 13.8 
Waseca 5.1 9.6 
Watonwan 20.9 20.3 
*Chart data obtained by the ACLU in Data Practices requests.  For more information, contact the authors.* 
 
  In 2011 and 2012, the Mankato office of the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Minnesota (ACLU-MN) received complaints of racial profiling and harassment of Latino 
residents in the small town of Gaylord, Minnesota.25  The ACLU-MN launched an investigation, 
                                                
22 See Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 13.03 (West 2012). 
23 Why We Chose Mankato, supra note 14. 
24 Source data on file with the authors.   
25 John Tevlin, ACLU review of one cop’s record is point of contention, STAR TRIBUNE (Jan. 15, 
2013), http://www.startribune.com/local/187057871.html.   





focused specifically on Gaylord police officer Eric Boon, including reviewing tapes from a 
dashboard camera, dispatch records, citations and reports from 261 of his stops.26  When viewed 
by race, the data indicated that 54% of Boon’s stops were of minority residents and 59% of the 
tickets he issued were to minorities.27  While this investigation received attention in the media, 
we are concerned that these issues will not be addressed by the government actors without 
formal action in the courts.  
 Following a separate incident, the ACLU of Minnesota filed a lawsuit against the 
Gaylord Police Department on February 12, 2013.28  The Complaint, filed in Federal District 
Court, alleges violations of Plaintiff Jesus Manuela Mendoza Sierra’s Fourth, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights when the defendant officers and deputies arrested, detained and 
interrogated her without probable cause to suspect that she had committed any criminal 
activities.29  The Complaint further alleges that the police illegally targeted Ms. Mendoza Sierra 
based on her color, ethnicity and national origin.30  The ACLU of Minnesota is concerned these 
actions remain common place in Southern Minnesota, where the ACLU perceives that residents 
                                                
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Complaint, Mendoza Sierra v. City of Gaylord, et al., No. 0:13CV00347 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 
2013), available at http://www.aclu-
mn.org/files/3613/6140/0623/Filed_Complaint_w_judge_assignment_Gaylord.pdf.  The 
Complaint names the City of Gaylord, Sibley County and numerous other governmental actors as 
defendants.  Id.  
29 Press Release, ACLU of Minnesota, ACLU-MN Files Discrimination Lawsuit Against 
Gaylord Police and Others (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.aclu-mn.org/news/2013/02/19/aclu-mn-
files-discrimination-lawsuit-against-gaylord-police. 
30 Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶ 1.  Ms. Mendoza Sierra is a lawful permanent resident who 
immigrated to Minnesota in May of 2009.  Id. at ¶ 7. 





like Ms. Mendoza Sierra are treated differently by local law enforcement officials simply due to 
their background and race.31 
III. RACIAL PROFILING LAW 
 The ACLU defines racial profiling as the “discriminatory practice by law enforcement 
officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual's race, ethnicity, 
religion or national origin.”32  Although some states define racial profiling as the practice of 
police relying “solely” on the basis of race or ethnicity in determining who to police, racial 
profiling occurs any time police use race as a factor in deciding who to stop or investigate.  
Racial profiling does not include police considering race when they are looking for a suspect and 
the description of the suspect includes information about the suspect’s race or ethnicity along 
with other identifying information.    
In addition to violating the constitutional right to equal protection, racial profiling can 
have devastating effects on communities of color.  Racial profiling results in minority 
communities being disproportionately targeted for law enforcement activities, making them more 
likely to have an arrest or even criminal record.  The collateral effects of having an arrest or 
criminal record include difficulties finding stable housing and employment.  Racial profiling also 
sows the seeds of distrust in the community, making people less likely to turn to the police when 
they are in trouble and making it more difficult to get cooperation from the public when they are 
investigating crimes.  For members of immigrant communities, some of whom are present in the 
U.S. without authorization, the collateral effects of racial profiling are amplified by their 
immigration status. 
                                                
31 Id. 
32 ACLU, Racial Profiling: Definition (Nov. 23, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/racial-
justice/racial-profiling-definition.  





A. LEGAL OVERVIEW 
 
 One means of addressing racial profiling is through litigation; however, litigation is not a 
panacea because the bar is high to prove that racial profiling has occurred. 
1. Racially-motivated stops under the Fourth Amendment 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s subjective intent to stop an individual is 
immaterial if the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.33  Probable 
cause exists when an officer sees a traffic violation. When the officer sees such a violation, he or 
she may stop the vehicle and conduct a reasonable investigation.34  A reasonable investigation 
includes asking the driver and passengers about their destination, route, and purpose.35  If an 
encounter after completion of a traffic stop is consensual, then an officer may ask questions 
unrelated to the stop and request consent to search the vehicle.36  However, police may not 
expand the scope of a traffic stop unless the expansion is supported by a reasonable articulable 
suspicion.37   
2. Racial profiling as a violation of the right to equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
In Whren, the Supreme Court noted that “the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement 
of the law based on considerations such as race.  But the constitutional basis for objecting to 
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth 
                                                
33 United States v. Gomez-Serena, 368 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004) (defendant who 
conceded officer had probable cause to conduct traffic stop failed to show officer stopped him 
solely on account of race) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). 
34 United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2005). 
35 Id. at 975. 
36 United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir. 2002). 
37 State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003).  





Amendment.”38  The Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection may become relevant 
prior to the initiation of a traffic stop.39  An officer’s discriminatory motivation to stop a vehicle 
because of the race or ethnicity of its occupants can give rise to an Equal Protection claim.40  To 
prevail on an Equal Protection claim, one must prove that the police officer subjected them “to 
unequal treatment based upon their race or ethnicity during the course of an otherwise lawful 
traffic stop . . . .”41 
 “[O]rdinary equal protection standards” govern claims alleging racially selective 
enforcement of facially neutral laws.42  To prevail on an equal protection claim, one must prove 
that the police officer’s decision to stop the vehicle or his conduct during the traffic stop was 
both: (1) motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and (2) had a discriminatory effect on the 
identifiable group to which the defendants belong.43  
                                                
38 517 U.S. at 813. 
39 United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997). 
40 Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2002). 
41 Id.  “The Supreme Court has held that ‘purposeful discrimination that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will also violate [18 U.S.C.] § 1981.’” Giron v. 
City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 944 (E.D. Ark. 2010) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 275–76 n.23 (2003)). 
42 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 
U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 
43 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (equal 
protection violation where evidence proved state had enacted a provision for the purpose of 
disfranchising blacks and the law had a discriminatory effect on blacks as compared to similarly 
situated whites)). See also Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983 
claim alleging selective enforcement of traffic laws in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 
United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (alleged selective enforcement of bicycle 
headlamp law); Farm Labor Organizing Comm., 308 F.3d at 533–36; Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 
251 F.3d 612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 suit alleging state police used racial classifications 
in deciding whom to stop, detain, and search in enforcing traffic laws); United States v. Bullock, 
94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Armstrong in denying defendant’s attempt to present 
evidence of trooper’s prior traffic stops to prove officer escalated traffic stops of young black 





 In United States v. Bell, the Eighth Circuit held that proof of discriminatory effect 
requires a plaintiff to prove that “people of another race violated the law and the law was not 
enforced against them.”44  For example, specific evidence of similarly situated non-minority 
motorists who were not stopped for the traffic violation, or statistical or other evidence which 
generally proves that members of a protected racial group receive less favorable treatment than 
nonmembers may both serve to prove discriminatory effect.45  There continues to be debate on 
whether it is necessary to name a similarly-situated individual.46 
 The second proof requirement – proof of discriminatory purpose – is much more difficult 
to establish.  Proof of discriminatory purpose requires one to show that the police officer’s 
decision to stop the vehicle was at least partially based on race.47  Discriminatory purpose 
“implies more than . . . intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies that the decision 
maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not 
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”48 
It is not necessary to prove that an officer lacked any race-neutral reason for conducting 
the traffic stop.49  However, the absence of a race-neutral reason for the stop, coupled with 
statistics showing that the officer disproportionately stops minorities, may lead a reasonable juror 
                                                                                                                                                       
males into drug investigations); United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453–54 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(no discriminatory purpose found where sheriff checked felony record of black defendant 
following traffic stop though he did not perform background checks on all persons he arrested). 
44 86 F.3d at 823. 
45 Chavez, 251 F.3d at 636; Farm Labor Org. Comm., 308 F.3d at 534; United States v. Barlow, 
310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002). 
46 See Albert. W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 
201 (2002). 
47 Bell, 86 F.3d at 823 (citing United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
48 Brown, 9 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610).   
49 See Farm Labor Org. Comm., 308 F.3d at 538. 





to conclude that the stop was based on a discriminatory purpose.50  In addition, “[A]n invidious 
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the 
fact, if it is true, that the [practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.”51  If a litigant 
makes a prima facie showing of both discriminatory effect and purpose, the burden shifts to the 
government to show the same enforcement decision would have been made even if race had not 
been considered.52 
 While a prima facie equal protection claim may be proved by direct evidence of racial 
discrimination,53 it is more commonly based on circumstantial evidence.54  A police officer’s 
discriminatory selective law enforcement may be inferred from evidence of the officer’s pattern 
and method of performing traffic stops and arrests, relevant departmental policies and training 
governing the officer’s conduct, failure to uniformly comply with the relevant training and 
supervisory instruction received, the questions presented and statements made by the officer to 
vehicle occupants, the specific events of the traffic stop at issue, and any other relevant 
information which may support an inference of discriminatory purpose in this context.55 
To the extent they are reliable, statistics may be used to evaluate whether the officer’s 
“pattern” of traffic stops and arrests raises an inference of racial discrimination or tends to prove 
                                                
50 See Berg v. United States, CIV 03-4642 MJD/JSM, 2007 WL 425448 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2007). 
51 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
52 Bell, 86 F.3d at 823 (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 819 n.2 (4th 
Cir. 1995)). 
53 See Crooks, 326 F.3d at 1000. 
54 See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here will seldom be 
‘eyewitness’ testimony as to [racially discriminatory] mental processes.”) (quoting U.S. Postal 
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). 
55 See Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003); see also 
United States v. Woods, 213 F.3d 1021, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing Minnesota’s policy 
and task force report on racial profiling). 





that similarly situated members of non-minority groups were treated better.56  While statistics 
alone will rarely be sufficient to prove racially discriminatory conduct, personal accounts of 
actual discrimination or the effects of discriminatory practices may complement this empirical 
evidence and bring “cold numbers convincingly to life.”57 
 Challenges “to the specific acts of a particular police officer bears some resemblance to a 
claim of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory jury challenges, which also involves the 
acts of a single state actor (the prosecutor) in the course of a single incident (the selection of the 
jury).”58  “In such cases, the Supreme Court has instructed that the court should ‘consider all 
relevant circumstances,’ including the prosecutor’s ‘pattern of strikes against black jurors,’ and 
the prosecutor’s ‘questions and statements,’ which may ‘support or refute an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.’”59  “Similarly, a police officer’s pattern of traffic stops and arrests, his 
questions and statements to the person involved, and other relevant circumstances may support 




                                                
56 Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1171. 
57 Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (evaluating sufficiency of 
evidence in a Title VII racial discrimination action); see also Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. 
Com’n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987) (statistical evidence revealing gender disparity in 
hiring and anecdotal evidence of discriminatory acts may establish pattern or practice of 
discrimination); Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent.”). 
58 Marshall, 345 F.3d at 1168. 
59 Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986)). 
60 Id. at 1168. 





B. EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAIMS 
 
In Giron v. City of Alexander,61 plaintiffs proved that defendant police officers 
purposefully and unlawfully considered their ethnicity in exercising discretion to stop their 
vehicles, violating their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 1981, and state 
law.62  The plaintiffs used direct evidence and numerical evidence gathered from citations issued 
by the police officer to prove their claim.63  The direct evidence included the testimony of a 
friend of the police officer who had accompanied the officer on ride alongs.64  The friend’s 
testimony spoke of the police officer’s use of certain traffic laws as a pretext to pull over 
Latinos.65  The plaintiffs also had a fellow police officer testify against the defendant, whom the 
witness viewed as his boss.66  For numerical evidence, the plaintiffs introduced the citation 
statistics of a defendant police officer, which showed a heavy bias towards Latinos.67  The claims 
were also buttressed with the fact of the city’s financial difficulties, providing incentive for the 
defendant’s superiors to overlook defendant’s actions in lieu of increasing city revenue.68  The 
court used this evidence to prove both discriminatory effect and purpose, rejecting defendant’s 
claim that the plaintiffs must show a similarly-situated individual who was not investigated or 
cited.69 
                                                
61 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2010). 
62 Id. at 939–42. 
63 Id. at 937–39. 
64 Id. at 925. 
65 Id. at 924–26. 
66 Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904, 927 (E.D. Ark. 2010). 
67 Id. at 928–31. 
68 Id. at 913–16. 
69 Id. at 938. 





 In United States v. Alcaraz-Arrellano,70 the court held that defendant did not carry his 
burden in producing some evidence of discriminatory purpose or effect.71  The court rejected a 
statistical study of police stops in the state because it did not include the jurisdiction of this 
particular police department, nor did the defendant show that the data was transferable due to an 
equal racial composition of the area studied and the area where the incident occurred.72  The 
circuit court also upheld the district court’s finding that the statistical data was unreliable because 
it did not include an appendix describing how the data was collected, because the sample size 
was too small, because the survey classified individuals’ races subjectively, because the police 
departments monitored were not random, and because the officers knew they were being 
monitored.73  In sum, the court found the statistics insufficient to show discriminatory effect.74 
The court disjointed discriminatory effect from discriminatory intent,75 noting that the defendant 
must “present some non-statistical evidence to demonstrate that [the police officer] acted with 
discriminatory intent when he stopped defendant.”76 
 In United States v. Barlow,77 the court rejected the statistical evidence offered by the 
defendant as neither reliable nor relevant, noting concern with the methodology of the study.78  
The court noted that even if it accepted the validity of the statistical evidence, the defendant “still 
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presented no evidence that he received less favorable treatment than similarly situated white 
travelers.”79  “To meet his burden under Armstrong, [defendant] needed to present evidence that 
the DEA agents observed whites engaging in the same behavior as defendant—i.e., looking 
nervously over their shoulders—but chose not to approach them.”80   The court also stated that 
the defendant had no evidence of discriminatory purpose, noting that the DEA agents made “no 
racial comments during their encounter with [defendant].”81 
 In United States v. Duque-Nava,82 the court rejected the same study as in United States v. 
Alcaraz-Arrellano for the same reasons.83  However, the court concluded that because the data of 
the individual deputy’s stops of Hispanic motorists was so much higher than the data in the 
discredited study, there was still a strong showing of discriminatory effect.84  As for 
discriminatory purpose, the court was much stricter.  The court noted that the defendant offered 
“scant direct evidence” to “support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his 
stop.”85   
There is no evidence that [the police officer] treated, spoke to, or otherwise 
exhibited discriminatory behavior towards defendant, the driver or any other 
persons previously stopped by [the officer] for a traffic violation . . .  In fact, [the 
police officer] testified that at the moment he decided to stop the pick-up truck 
because of the cracked windshield, he had ‘no idea’ of the driver's or defendant's 
race or ethnicity.86   
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Defendant noted that the police officer “pulled next to the truck before signaling the 
driver to stop, implying that [the officer] observed the driver's or defendant's appearance before 
making the stop,” but the police officer testified that it is a “standard practice that allows the 
officer to determine the number of occupants of the car for purposes of officer safety.”87  The 
court did note that, “[a]lthough statistics alone are generally viewed as insufficient evidence of 
intent, certainly a comparison of an officer's stops with similarly situated officers in his own 
police department might be evidence of an officer's particular pattern of discriminatory intent or 
motive.”88  For statistics to work to show intent, the court noted that “one must show causality” 
which has “three components: temporal order; correlation; and lack of alternative plausible 
explanations.”89 
In Berg v. United States,90 the Minnesota District Court found that fact questions 
remained for a jury to decide whether DEA agents, who stopped and searched an airline 
passenger because her bag looked heavy, had adequate suspicion to justify the stop.91  In 
addition, because the data showed that the agent’s cold stops were overwhelmingly minorities, 
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the stop of Berg was racially 
motivated.92 
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Finally, in Anderson v. Cornejo,93 a group of African-American women sued, alleging 
that they were subjected to non-routine searches by U.S. Customs employees following their 
arrival on international airline flights in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to Equal 
Protection.94  Although numerous claims were dismissed based on qualified immunity or failure 
to adequately prove both discriminatory treatment and purpose, the District Court concluded that 
several of the plaintiffs were able to show that customs agents lacked adequate suspicion for the 
non-routine searches, that some of the plaintiffs were treated differently than similarly-situated 
white individuals,95 and that factors, including the inadequate basis for searches, false statements 
by customs agents as to the reasons for the searches, and statistical disparities, were sufficient to 
establish that some of the defendants acted with discriminatory intent.96 
C. RACIAL PROFILING CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA COURTS 
Minnesota courts have addressed the issue of police racial profiling in several cases.  In 
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the standard for a 
claim of unfair discriminatory practices in the provision of public services under the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act.97  The court held that proof of racial discrimination in the area of public 
services could be established with either: (1) proof that, in the provision of public services, the 
individual’s treatment was worse than similarly situated individuals of a different race, or (2) 
proof that the way in which the individual was treated was so at variance with what is reasonably 
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anticipated in the absence of racial discrimination that the probable explanation for the treatment 
is racial discrimination.98 
 Two recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions applied the Richardson “at variance” 
test in the context of racial profiling allegations against the Minneapolis Police Department.  In  
Williams v. Minneapolis Police Department,99 the court of appeals upheld a decision by the 
Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights that police engaged in racial discrimination when they 
detained an African American man based on an officer’s observation that the man was standing 
on a grassy area near a lake frequently used by runners, dressed in jogging clothes, stretching 
while talking on a cell phone, and across the street from another African American on a bike in 
an area with a high incidence of thefts from vehicles.  The court concluded that police did not 
have specific and articulable facts to establish reasonable grounds to suspect Williams of 
criminal activity and the length of time that Williams was detained (30 minutes in a squad car) 
was unreasonable.100  
 In Minneapolis Police Department v. Kelly,101 the court of appeals affirmed a 
Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights awarding damages to an individual arrested by 
Minneapolis police.102  In Kelly, a Minneapolis Park Police officer detained an African American 
Minneapolis resident who was walking to a convenience store because the officer thought he 
matched the description of a robbery suspect.103  Kelly did not understand why police stopped 
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him and he resisted being handcuffed and placed in the squad car.104  Police brought Kelly to the 
scene of the robbery and witnesses told them that he was not the robber.  By this time, Kelly had 
calmed down and he asked to be released.  Instead of releasing him, police decided to charge him 
with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and obstruction.  Instead of issuing him citations for the 
charges, they took him to jail where he was held for approximately five hours.105  The charges 
were later dropped.106  The Commission concluded that jailing Kelly was a clear violation of 
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires police to issue a citation for 
misdemeanor offenses except in limited circumstances that were not present in this case.  Thus, 
police treatment of Kelly was so “at variance” with what would reasonably be expected under 
the circumstances that racial discrimination was the probable explanation.107  The court held that 
the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial 
evidence.108 
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 This line of cases offers a useful roadmap for individuals claiming racial profiling against 
police.  Police practices such as full custodial arrest in lieu of issuing a citation, interrogating 
vehicle passengers without any reasonable suspicion,109 stopping out of state vehicles for 
excessive window tint,110 and questioning relating to immigration status111 could all potentially 
serve as a basis for arguing that police conduct was so “at variance” with what is reasonably 
expected under the circumstances that racial discrimination was the probable explanation. 
Minnesota law does, however, have some loopholes that would allow police to engage in 
racial profiling in a manner that would not be considered “at variance” with what is reasonably 
expected under the circumstances.112  For example, police routinely run random license plate 
checks on vehicles they encounter.113  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held in State v. Setinich 
that computerized license plate checks do not constitute a search under the Fourth 
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Amendment.114  Further, it is common for police to initiate a traffic stop when the vehicle license 
query indicates that the owner of the vehicle does not have a valid driver’s license.  The owner’s 
lack of a valid driver’s license has been upheld as valid grounds for a stop by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.115  In the days before random computerized checks, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court upheld a stop based on the officer’s knowledge that one month prior, the owner had a 
suspended license.116    
Fifteen years later in State v. Pike, the Minnesota Supreme court noted that it is 
reasonable for an officer to infer that the vehicle’s owner is the one driving the vehicle and 
reiterated that knowing that the owner of the vehicle does not have a valid license is sufficient to 
form reasonable suspicion for a stop.117  The court clarified that the assumption may be 
unreasonable when the actual driver does not match the description of the owner.118  Thus, where 
the owner is a young male and the driver is an older female, “any reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity evaporates.”119 
D. CONCLUSION  
 It is the ACLU’s opinion that because a valid vehicle stop will not, absent other evidence, 
lead to liability for racial profiling, targeting Latino-looking drivers and making pretextual stops 
based on minor traffic infractions (or the registered owner’s lack of a driver’s license) can be a 
low-risk, high-reward proposition for police officers who feel compelled to engage in informal 
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immigration enforcement.  Discriminatory policing may also occur when officers who have 
unrecognized, internalized racial biases or anti-immigrant biases when they choose to focus their 
efforts on identifying unlicensed drivers as opposed to observable traffic violations such as 
speeding or careless driving.  
 While litigation can be a powerful tool when pursued with the right set of facts and 
documentation, it can also be very difficult to obtain the statistical records and other evidence 
needed to prove discriminatory treatment and discriminatory purpose.  Litigation is even more 
difficult when the victims of racial profiling are present in the U.S. without authorization.  Even 
though driving without a license is a misdemeanor requiring a citation rather than custodial 
arrest, some officers may choose custodial arrest anyway.  Once an individual is booked into jail, 
their information, including country of birth, can be reviewed by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) who may ask the local jail to put a hold on the individual while they decide 
whether or not they want to take custody of the person.  Although ICE holds are voluntary, it is 
common for local jails to honor them.  The ICE hold often leads to removal proceedings.  Even 
where the person is the victim of blatant racial profiling, their most pressing concern is to fight 
removal, not seek vindication for racial profiling.  Even if they do seek vindication for the racial 
profiling, the person may end up being deported long before litigation moves forward.  











IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE DRIVER’S LICENSE LAWS 
 
 Reducing restrictions on an immigrant’s ability to obtain a driver’s license or driving 
permit has been a longtime goal of immigrant communities and advocates.120  While this remains 
a highly politicized issue, recent legislation suggests that many states are currently working 
toward expanding access to driver’s licenses rather than creating new restrictions.121  In 2013, 
bills were introduced in 19 states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that 
would allow for driver’s licenses or permits for undocumented immigrants.122  Eight states, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico enacted laws expanding immigrants’ access to licenses, 
and another three states, including Minnesota, are likely to revisit similar legislation introduced 
last session.123  This upswing in activity reverses a trend that began shortly after the events of 
September 11, 2001.124   
 A. REAL ID ACT 
 The enactment of the federal REAL ID Act125 in 2005 “prompted some states to impose 
restrictions and document requirements that prevent[ed] certain [undocumented] immigrants 
from obtaining licenses.”126  Passed as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
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for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, REAL ID provides, in pertinent 
part, that “driver’s licenses cannot be accepted by federal agencies for any ‘official’ purpose 
unless they meet the act’s documentation-related requirements,” including proof of U.S. 
citizenship or valid immigration status.127  The sponsors of the Act were responding to findings 
in the 9/11 Commission report that several of the 9/11 hijackers obtained state driver’s licenses 
and used them to board the planes.128  Although REAL ID was initially set to go into effect by 
2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has continually pushed backed its 
enforcement schedule.129  A recent press release from DHS states that “[t]he Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) will continue to accept driver’s licenses and state-issued 
identification cards from all jurisdictions until at least 2016.”130 
Since the enactment of REAL ID, only 19 states have been found to be in full 
compliance, with over half of the states, including Minnesota,131 passing laws or resolutions in 
opposition.132  Real ID has been attacked on several grounds, with opponents claiming that it 
places an undue burden on taxpayers, citizens, immigrants and state governments, as well as 
creating a privacy risk that highly sensitive personal data will be compiled in a single, national 
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database.133  Regardless of its effect, or lack thereof, REAL ID’s provisions still allow states to 
also issue driver’s licenses that do not meet the minimum standards for official federal use,134 
thus allowing states to issue driving privilege licenses or permits to immigrants for non-
identification purposes. 
B. STATES LAWS ALLOWING LICENSES REGARDLESS OF 
IMMIGRATION STATUS 
 
 As of 2012, only three states, New Mexico, Washington and Utah, issued driver’s 
licenses or permits to residents regardless of immigration status.  First, New Mexico’s law went 
into effect in 2003. 135  It allows an individual to obtain a driver’s license even if they do not have 
a Social Security number, as long as they provide other required documentation, including proof 
of identity and residency.136  Second, Washington’s law went into effect in 2004. 137  It allows an 
individual to obtain a driver’s license even if they cannot show proof of legal presence, if they 
can present proof of identity through acceptable documents.138  New Mexico, Washington, and 
Utah are the only states to issue the same type of driver’s license to all drivers, regardless of 
immigration status.139  The final state in this group, Utah, passed its law in 2005.140  Utah 
provides for a one-year driving privilege card for those who do not present a Social Security 
number, if they can show acceptable documentation to verify their identity and Utah 
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residence.141  This card is distinguished from other Utah driver’s licenses with the statement “for 
driving privileges only—not valid for identification.”142 
 Eight additional states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico passed legislation in 
2013 to allow immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or permits regardless of their immigration 
status.  These include: California (effective January 1, 2015 or potentially earlier); 143 Colorado 
(effective August 1, 2014);144 Connecticut (effective January 1, 2015);145 District of Columbia 
(effective May 1, 2014);146 Illinois (effective November 28, 2013);147 Maryland (effective 
January 1, 2014);148 Nevada (effective January 1, 2014);149 Oregon (effective January 1, 
2014);150 Puerto Rico (effective August 7, 2014),151 and Vermont (effective January 1, 2014).152  
While there are significant differences between the laws, including specific requirements, 
restrictions, and time periods for validity, the key similarities are that each state sets forth 
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acceptable documentation to establish identity and state residence, and requires a distinguishing 
feature on the document that separates it from other state-issued driver’s licenses.    
 C. EFFORTS IN MINNESOTA 
 According to a 2010 report from the Pew Hispanic Center, Minnesota is estimated to 
have a population of 95,000 undocumented immigrants.153  Prior to 2003, Minnesota residents 
without lawful immigration status were not barred from obtaining a driver’s license.  The change 
in requirements occurred through an Administrative Rule change under the administration of 
Governor Tim Pawlenty.  Four months after 9/11, Pawlenty’s Commissioner of the Department 
of Public Safety (DPS) initiated the rulemaking process to require driver’s license applicants to 
provide proof of lawful presence.154 The rulemaking process was put on hold while the 
Legislature considered anti-terrorism legislation.155  When the session ended without action on 
driver’s license applications, DPS picked up the rulemaking process and adopted it through 
emergency rulemaking procedures, claiming that the rules were necessary to address a serious 
and immediate threat to public safety (i.e. terrorism) and that it would be contrary to the public 
interest to allow the public review and comment that would be required under the ordinary 
rulemaking process.156  The emergency rulemaking process was challenged by the ACLU of 
Minnesota and a group of organizations and individuals who would be affected by the new rules 
and who wished to have input into the rulemaking process.157  The Court of Appeals invalidated 
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the emergency rules, finding that DPS failed to demonstrate how using the ordinary public 
rulemaking process would be harmful to the public interest.158   
 In 2003, after the Court of Appeals decision, DPS again adopted the rules through the 
ordinary rulemaking process.  Among other things, the rules stated that “[t]he department shall 
not issue a driver’s license, permit, or identification card if an individual has no lawful admission 
status to the United States.”159  Since the Administrative Rule change did not apply to driver’s 
license renewals, undocumented immigrants who received a license prior to 2003 are still able to 
renew their licenses under the same procedures as other Minnesota drivers. 
 The public campaign for expanding the driver’s license privilege to all Minnesotans was 
already in full force at the beginning of the 2013 session of the Minnesota Legislature.160  Bills 
were introduced in the House and Senate on February 4, 2013 that would allow identification 
issued by another country to be an acceptable proof of identity for Minnesota’s licensure 
requirements.161  Advocates generally framed the issue in terms of public safety, while 
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individuals in the Latino community shared personal stories of living in fear and the logistical 
difficultly of living and working in Minnesota without a valid driver’s license.162   
In March 2013, both the House and the Senate bills passed the necessary committees, 
clearing the important policy committee deadlines.163  However, the Senate version was amended 
to create a “driving privilege license” for Minnesota residents who are “unable to demonstrate 
legal presence in this country through current lawful admission status, permanent resident status, 
indefinite authorized presence status, or United States citizenship.”164   It also contained a 
provision that “[a] driving privilege license must be plainly marked ‘FOR DRIVING 
ONLY.’.”165  
 In mid-May 2013, with only days remaining in the Legislative session, immigrant 
advocacy groups and individual Latinos began a hunger strike at the Capitol to raise awareness 
and demand action on the pending bills.166  At that time, Governor Mark Dayton stated that he 
was opposed to allowing undocumented immigrants to get driver’s licenses, but agreed to meet 
with the bill’s supporters if the legislation passed in both houses of the Legislature.167  The 
Senate bill finally received a floor vote on May 18, 2013, only three days before the scheduled 
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end of the Legislative session, where it passed on a vote of 36-28. 168   The House of 
Representatives failed to take further action before the end of the Legislative session on May 21, 
2013.169      
 D. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO EXPANDING THE PRIVILEGE  
 Opponents of expanding the driver’s license privilege to undocumented immigrants often 
argue that it rewards illegal behavior, raises national security concerns, and facilitates voting 
fraud.  Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.   
 First, critics often argue that the state should not validate individuals who are present in 
the United States in violation of immigration laws.170  Regardless of one’s moral view of 
undocumented immigrants, these individuals live, work, and often have U.S. citizen family 
members in our communities.  As noted above, Minnesota is estimated to have a population of 
roughly 95,000 undocumented immigrants.171  It would be both impractical and cost-prohibitive 
to put all of these individuals into removal proceedings.  Immigration law is a federal matter, and 
a state’s role in issuing driver’s licenses to its residents should not be dictated by federal 
immigration policy.     
 Second, opponents argue that allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain a state issued 
driver’s license raises national security concerns.172  These concerns are typically linked to a fear 
of terrorism and the fact that all but one of the nineteen terrorists responsible for the September 
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11th attacks obtained some form of state issued identification.173  These concerns are easily 
countered as myths by Professor Margaret Stock of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 
her leading article on driver’s licenses and national security.174  Professor Stock states that “[t]he 
national debate about the connection between driver licenses and security has been characterized 
by misinformation, and a lack of appreciation of the role that driver license and state 
identification databases play in national security and law enforcement.”175  In fact, Professor 
Stock argues that “[d]enying drivers licenses to illegal immigrants will hurt our national security 
by depriving law enforcement officials of critical information on substantial numbers of adults 
who are physically present in the United States.”176  
 Finally, some have raised concerns that issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented 
immigrants will enable voting fraud by non-citizens.  Even though some officials in other states, 
such as Arizona, claim that undocumented immigrants commit voter fraud in large numbers, 
reports have found that this simply is not the case.177  States that have recently investigated 
whether non-citizens register to vote have found extremely low numbers of voter registration 
fraud.  A report from 2013 noted that “[i]n Colorado, election officials found 141 noncitizens on 
the voter rolls, which was 0.004% of the state’s nearly 3.5 million voters.  Florida officials found 
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207, or 0.001% of the state’s 11.4 million registered voters.”178  These numbers are hardly 
surprising given the fact that in order to register to vote, one must declare under penalty of 
perjury that one is a U.S. citizen, which creates a strong disincentive for undocumented 
immigrants to register to vote.  Federal immigration law carries severe sanctions for anyone who 
falsely claims to be a U.S. citizen or votes in an election.  For example, a person who makes a 
false claim to U.S. citizenship is deemed inadmissible.179  In addition, any person who votes in 
violation of federal, state or local law is inadmissible to the United States.180  Even a lawfully 
admitted immigrant who makes a false claim to citizenship is subject to removal from the United 
States.181  Based on these extreme penalties, it is highly unlikely that an undocumented 
immigrant that has availed himself or herself of the state to obtain a driving privilege license 
would risk committing voter fraud.   
 E. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EXPANDING THE PRIVILEGE 
 As noted above, the primary argument in support of expanding the driver’s license 
privilege to all residents regardless of immigration status is promoting public safety.  In addition, 
one may persuasively argue that the expansion would also increase the percentage of insured 
drivers, allow for increased participation in society, and decrease instances of racial profiling of 
Latino immigrants.   
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 Driving is a part of everyday life in this country, and licensing those who drive on a 
state’s roads and highways is clearly a benefit to public safety.182  With expanded licensure, 
undocumented immigrants would be required to take the same road tests and written exams 
required to establish basic driving competence, as well as eyesight exams, before the state would 
issue a driver’s license.   Licensed undocumented immigrants would also have less fear of 
interaction with law enforcement, potentially resulting in a lower rate of hit-and-run accidents.183  
Studies have shown that a license increases the willingness of immigrant witnesses and victims 
to cooperate with police and aid in investigations.184  Not surprisingly, many law enforcement 
officials have supported efforts to expand the driver’s license privilege to all immigrants 
regardless of immigration status.185 
 Another argument linked to public safety is that allowing licenses for undocumented 
immigrants will decrease the percentage of drivers in the state who are uninsured.  After enacting 
their laws, Utah saw a nearly 80% drop in uninsured drivers, and New Mexico saw a nearly 60% 
drop.186  The increase in insured drivers reduces insurance premiums for all drivers as the pool of 
insured drivers expands.187  It also reduces the number of accidents involving uninsured 
drivers.188 
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 Next, the ability to obtain a valid driving privilege license allows for increased 
participation in society.  In most parts of the country, one needs to drive in order to conduct all 
types of daily business, including visits to health care providers, schools and shopping centers.  
A study from 2005 showed that only 4.7% of Americans used public transportation to get to 
work, compared with 87.7% who drove.189  It is increasingly hard to function in the United 
States without being able to drive, and especially difficult in rural areas like those in Greater 
Minnesota.   
 Finally, expanding the privilege could also decrease instances of the racial profiling of 
Latino residents.  As discussed above, racial profiling of immigrant communities often begins 
with stops of vehicles based on the ground that the registered owner does not have a valid 
driver’s license.  Accordingly, by allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain a driving 
privilege license, policy makers could remove one often-abused tool in the commission of racial 
profiling.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 As the ACLU of Minnesota has seen through its experience in Greater Minnesota, racial 
profiling is a serious problem, the causes of which are multifaceted.  Consequently, there is no 
one strategy that will identify and eliminate all forms of racial profiling by law enforcement.  It 
is important for policymakers to consider whether and to what extent various laws and policies 
will alleviate or exacerbate racial biases in our criminal justice system.  Making driver’s licenses 
available to all qualified drivers regardless of their immigration status will not end racial 
profiling, but it will help eliminate a tool that can be used by police to engage in the profiling of 
Latino immigrants.  While it is clear that state laws that restrict driver’s licenses will not fix the 
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United States’ broken immigration system, laws that make driver’s licenses available regardless 
of immigration status will improve public safety and help insulate immigrant communities, like 
those in Greater Minnesota, from the devastating effects of racial profiling. 
 
 
